The Neo-Gramscians in the study of international relations:an appraisal by McNally, Mark
 UWS Academic Portal






Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication on the UWS Academic Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
McNally, M. (2017). The Neo-Gramscians in the study of international relations: an appraisal. Materialismo
Storico, 2(1), 93-114.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the UWS Academic Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact pure@uws.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the
work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 17 Sep 2019





The Neo-Gramscians in the Study of International Relations: An 
Appraisal1 
 
Mark McNally (University of the West of Scotland) 
  
In this article I provide an appraisal of the neo-Gramscian approach to the study of 
international relations by focusing on three of its major exponents: Robert Cox, Stephen 
Gill and Adam Morton. I argue that neo-Gramscians have yet to adequately address 
some important challenges and criticisms of their method around its overly “top-down” 
mode of analysis, its neglect of forms of resistance and its excessively global and 
cosmopolitan account of neoliberal hegemony and especially resistance. I maintain that a 
return to the letter of Gramsci’s writings on hegemony and its national-popular and 
democratic character would not only allow neo-Gramscians to address more effectively 
these weaknesses, but also strengthen their approach and align it more effectively with 
trends in contemporary politics. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Since Robert Cox’s seminal interventions in the 1980s2, Antonio 
Gramsci has become a familiar presence in the study of international 
relations (IR) and international political economy (IPE)3. In fact, a 
whole “school” of study in IR developed on the back of Cox’s ground-
breaking work throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium 
where neo-Gramscians remain today an important alternative to more 
mainstream and traditional approaches in this field – principally (neo) 
realism and liberal internationalism. 
In this article, I provide an appraisal of neo-Gramscian scholarship in 
the study of IR by focusing on the work of three of its leading 
proponents: Robert Cox, Stephen Gill and Adam Morton. The first 
section explores the unique nature of this neo-Gramscian intervention in 
                                                 
1 This article is the product of a paper delivered at the “Egemonia dopo 
Gramsci” Conference in September 2016 at the University of Pavia. I am 
grateful to the organizers of the conference for their support and to its 
contributors for comments on an earlier draft. 
2 COX 1981, 1983, 1987. 
3 International political economy is treated in this article as a sub-field of 
international relations. 





IR with reference mainly to Cox and to a lesser extent Gill and Morton. 
I focus in particular on the principal Gramscian concept of hegemony, 
demonstrating how it provided these scholars with the conceptual 
apparatus to make a welcome and important contribution to the field of 
IR that had become entrenched in an uncritical “problem-solving” 
positivist mode of enquiry. This provides the context for the appraisal 
which follows where I give a more personal evaluation of the approach, 
raising three key criticisms or challenges for neo-Gramscian IR 
specialists which, it seems to me at least, they have so far failed to 
address adequately. I conclude by arguing that a retrieval of the 
«national-popular» character of Gramsci’s hegemony would allow neo-
Gramscians to address these shortcomings and strengthen and develop 




2. The Impact of the Concept of Hegemony in International Relations 
 
There is little doubt that the introduction of the Gramscian concept 
of hegemony in the study of IR has made a welcome transformative 
contribution to scholarship in this area. Its innovation lies in the fact 
that its authors seek to develop in IR studies a critical theory tradition, 
whose origins can be traced to Marxist Historical Materialism and the 
Frankfurt School4. They therefore refuse to take for granted or to 
naturalize power relations and the states that direct and anchor them. 
Indeed, neo-Gramscians reject the positivist, “problem-solving” 
approaches of conventional IR - particularly of a (neo-)realist variety - 
since the latter are embedded in an epistemology that provides little 
more than explanation. The goal of neo-Gramscians, by contrast, is not 
to explain the current world order but to transform it by calling into 
question how state power and global orders come into existence 
historically, and how they might be subject to challenge by emerging 
social and political forces of opposition5. 
The critical leverage is achieved primarily by drawing on the class 
and ideological analysis at the core of Gramsci’s account of hegemony. 
                                                 
4 For the relationship of Gramsci’s thought to the wider critical theory tradition 
see, HOLUB 1992. 
5 COX 1981, pp. 128-29; GILL 2012. 





For, unlike in the work of their realist or liberal internationalist 
predecessors, as Morton puts it, «class struggle is …faced rather than 
effaced in this historical materialist conceptualization of critical theory» 
and accordingly, their work takes the form of «an enquiry into distinct 
capitalist relations corresponding to forms of property ownership, state 
power, and unfreedom»6. The neo-Gramscian project is primarily 
orientated, however, around a reliance on Gramsci’s account of 
hegemony. 
Firstly, they effectively employ the Gramscian notion that dominant 
social forces achieve hegemony by a combination of force and consent7 to 
reject conventional usage of the term in IR that privileges a limited 
conception of the state and its monopoly of coercion. Here it is 
important to note, however, that the domination achieved through 
military and economic power is not simply rejected for the moment of 
consent, but rather wedded to it in a manner that recognizes that force 
or domination is an integral component of any hegemonic order8. As 
Cox puts it, dominance is «a necessary but not a sufficient condition of 
hegemony»9, and force is in fact employed resourcefully since 
«Hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behaviour in most people 
most of the time»10. 
This shift in focus away from the concerns of traditional IR by 
drawing on the idea at the core of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony that 
power is also exercised by relations of conformity and consent, opened up 
the study of international relations to a broader and richer framework of 
analysis. In fact, it redirected attention to the ways in which states, state 
formations and world orders are sustained through ideological struggle. 
The manufacturing of consent at the global level was a particularly 
important advance. World hegemony, according to Cox, is established 
through global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Economic 
                                                 
6 MORTON 2007, p. 118. See too MORTON 2006. 
7 GRAMSCI 1975, Q1, §48, pp. 58-9; GRAMSCI 1992, pp. 155-56. All references to 
the Prison Notebooks are to the Gerratana critical edition (1975) followed by 
the relevant English language translation. 
8 GRAMSCI 1975, Q1, §44, pp. 40-2; GRAMSCI 1992, pp. 136-38. See too, 
THOMAS 2009, pp. 162-5. 
9 COX 1981, p. 139. 
10 COX 1983, p. 164. 





Cooperation and Development (OECD). International organization on 
this scale: 
 
«functions as the process through which the institutions of hegemony and 
its ideology are developed. Among the features of international organization 
which express its hegemonic role are the following: (1) the institutions embody 
the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are 
themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically 
legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from 
peripheral countries; (5) they absorb counterhegemonic ideas»11. 
 
The manufacture of ideology that reproduces and normalizes class-
based conceptions of the world links the neo-Gramscians not only to 
Gramsci, but wider constructivist tendencies in critical and cultural 
theory including the Frankfurt School and currents of critical 
poststructuralism12. A certain tension exists though within the various 
strands of neo-Gramscianism, between those who are prepared to push 
this latter route to the point at which it threatens the foundationalism of 
the neo-Gramscian approach in a Historical Materialist analysis of the 
socio-economic and political order.  
Neo-Gramscians also draw innovatively on the «relations of forces» 
element of Gramsci’s account of hegemony in a manner that moves 
beyond Gramsci, while nonetheless capturing the central Gramscian 
principle at its heart that power should not be analyzed as some unified, 
homogenous top-down phenomenon, as is typical in some realist 
approaches to IR. Accordingly, the state and the world order are not 
conceived by neo-Gramscians as the expression of one social class, but 
rather complex and sometimes contradictory power configurations of 
class and ideological alliances that span the economic, political and 
cultural spheres. They in fact follow Gramsci in assuming that 
hegemonic forces can and do «lead» in hegemonic orders, but it is 
always in the context of a dynamic set of «relations of forces». This 
means that leading groups must continually consolidate and forge new 
relations of hegemony with subordinate or subaltern forces in a process 
that aims at «not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also 
intellectual and moral unity»13. 
                                                 
11 COX 1983, p. 172. 
12 GILL 2012, p. 507. 
13 GRAMSCI 1975, Q13, §17, p. 1584; GRAMSCI 1971, p. 181. 





Crucially, what the «relations of forces» dimension does for the neo-
Gramscians, is that it allows them to fully exploit the vital strategic 
dimension of hegemony in Gramsci that eschews simplistic class 
sectarian and «economic-corporate» accounts of capitalist power or 
resistance14. This captures effectively the way in which social forces that 
arise from particular modes of production build alliances with other 
social forces at the state and international level by making concessions 
and compromises. Hegemony thus presents itself as a «universal» 
programme in the interests of all sections of society, or indeed, the 
global community15. 
In fact, Cox, in a move that resonates with a famous passage in the 
Prison Notebooks on the relations of forces in the structure and 
superstructure16, sets out three mutually conditioning «spheres of 
activity» that must be addressed in the analysis of any historical 
structure:  
social forces – the social groups that are engendered through 
particular ways of organizing production;  
forms of state - understood in the Gramscian sense as «state/society 
complexes» or «historical blocs»;  
world order - a historically contingent configuration of forces at the 
global level that can be characterized by stability or conflict. 
He then identifies three further mutually conditioning realms of the 
relations of forces within each of these spheres of activity: 
ideas – widely shared «intersubjective meanings» on the nature of 
social relations as well as conflicting «collective images of social order 
held by different groups of people» that incorporate «differing views as 
to both the nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations»; 
material capabilities – technological and organizational capabilities and 
stocks of accumulated industrial and military resources and the wealth 
that can command them; 
institutions – «particular amalgams of ideas and material power which 
in turn influence the development of ideas and material capabilities»17. 
On one level, it is arguable that there seems to be a kind of linear 
determinism and economism at work here. This is particularly evident 
                                                 
14 SASSOON 1987, pp. 116-19. 
15 COX 1996, p. 99. 
16 GRAMSCI 1975, Q13, §17, pp. 1583-86; GRAMSCI 1971, pp. 180-85. 
17 COX 1981, pp. 135-38. 





in Morton’s statement that Cox’s framework «focuses on how power in 
social relations of production may give rise to certain social forces, how 
these social forces may become the basis of power in forms of state and 
how this might shape world order»18. However, neo-Gramscians are at 
pains to point out the reciprocal and dialectical relationship between 
various levels of the social and global orders (national, regional and 
international). They thus reject charges of abstract determinism 
emphasizing the historically specific and partially open-ended 
constitution of structures and social forces that leaves space for human 
agency and diversity of experience19. While tensions remain between the 
deterministic and dialectical/historicist character of the framework, the 
outcome is arguably a sophisticated relational account of hegemony that 
once again captures the essence of Gramsci’s concept. 
Neo-Gramscians also follow Gramsci in recognizing that no 
hegemonic order is unassailable. They thus incorporate into the 
«relations of forces» the historically unique forms of national and 
international resistance engendered from within. It is here where the 
potential for change and transformation is often located. Morton, for 
example, explores how the uneven development of global capitalism 
affects its periphery where attempts at hegemony often take the form of 
«passive revolution». In effect, passive revolutions are elite and state-led 
social upheavals that produce a «restoration» of the current order in a 
new arrangement of social forces. They can take the form of externally 
motivated and assisted ruptures with little popular involvement in 
which elites employ the state apparatus to intervene economically to 
institute a radical «catch up» strategy with the capitalist core. 
Alternatively, they can also present as relatively far-reaching social 
transformations that are engendered by deep popular unrest in which 
elites successfully use state intervention to head-off serious 
revolutionary resistance and change by co-optation and compromise. 
Crucially, both aim to extend or restore capitalist relations of 
production, but achieve only a «minimal form of hegemony» due to the 
lack of genuine popular involvement. Popular resistance can thus either 
grow and triumph in the longer term or – as has traditionally been the 
case - be absorbed and tamed in the passive revolutionary dialectic of 
                                                 
18 MORTON 2007, p. 117. 
19 COX 1981, pp. 134-35; GILL 1993, pp. 26-7; MORTON 2013. p. 143. 





«revolution and restoration»20. Morton, for example, explores in great 
detail the Zapatista (EZLN) resistance in Mexico21, demonstrating the 
potential of this neo-Gramscian approach to explore resistance within 
the ambit of national and global hegemonic politics.  
The final step in the neo-Gramscian acquisition and reconfiguration 
of Gramsci’s hegemony in IR involves the translation of its theoretical 
framework and particularly its novel concept of «world order» to the 
actual historical development of states and global inter-state relations. 
According to Cox and others, there have in fact been two major «world 
orders» in the post-Second World War period. The first is usually 
defined as a US-led hegemonic world order or Pax Americana that lasted 
until the 1970s. The social forces it engendered developed out of a Fordist 
accumulation model with high levels of production and consumption and 
a mixed economy. Stability and relative industrial peace were secured by 
tri-partite agreements involving government, business and labour 
unions. Its corresponding form of state was the Keynesian Welfare State 
with its developed welfare system and its moderate interventionism that 
aimed at high levels of employment. This world order was promoted 
ideologically by the principles of «embedded liberalism» which defended 
the free market and free trade on the Bretton Woods model of fixed 
exchange rates, but recognized that domestic stability required state 
intervention and some redistribution of wealth. States - and especially 
the United States - were its key institutional anchoring points in the 
global order and they enjoyed considerable autonomy. Other emerging 
international institutions – the IMF and WB - promoted and protected 
its mode of production, ideas and form of state globally22. 
The second world order was initially described by Cox and others as 
the era of «globalization», though it is defined in more recent neo-
Gramscian work as a world order characterized by a virulent form of 
globalized and increasingly authoritarian «neoliberalism»23. It emerged 
from the economic crisis and breakdown of the post-War consensus in 
the 1970s when the Pax Americana was deeply destabilized by the 
                                                 
20 MORTON 2007, pp. 63-73; MORTON 2013, pp. 18-40. For more recent 
discussions of the concept of «passive devolution» in Gramsci that broadens our 
understanding of this key category see ANTONINI 2016; MODONESI 2016. 
21 MORTON 2013, pp. 199-236. 
22 COX 1987, pp. 211-67; MORTON 2007, p. 123; GILL AND LAW 1988, pp. 79-
80.  
23 BIELER, BRUFF AND MORTON 2015; BRUFF 2014. 





internationalization of production and the state24. This global 
restructuring of production, characterized by the spread of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and the territorial dispersion of single productive 
processes across states, threw up new social forces. Both Capital and 
Labour tended to divide between those elements whose interests lay in 
sustaining and protecting domestic industries and others who acquired 
new wealth and advantages in this more open global market economy. 
The major change here was the increasing dominance of Finance Capital 
and the emergence of a «transnational managerial class» who drove the 
process of economic globalization from beyond the reach of the state25. 
The form of state that sustains this world order, according to Cox, is a 
«hyperliberal form of state»26 that becomes in effect a «transmission 
belt» for neoliberalization «from the global to the national economy»27. 
Morton, however, is somewhat less convinced of the extent of this 
globalization and weakening of the nation-state28. Gill, by contrast, 
describes this world order in Foucauldian terms as a «global 
panopticon» that institutes a «new constitutionalism» in which the rules 
and prescriptions of neoliberalism are meticulously surveyed and 
regulated across states where deviance is disciplined and punished.  
Indeed, power is employed efficiently as states and other institutions 
self-regulate, developing increasingly exploitative and efficiency-driven 
practices of heightened observation and control over citizens and 
workers, attuned to survival in the wider neoliberal world order.  From 
this perspective, transnational political and economic institutions such 
as the IMF, G7, WB, WTO and the European Union (EU) and its 
European Central Bank (ECB) become increasingly more fundamental to 
the maintenance of this new neoliberal world order. They disseminate, 
normalize and regulate an ideology of uncompromising neoliberalism 
committed to market fundamentalism and a «rolling back» of state 
intervention in the economy for dirigiste or welfare purposes. The 
imposition of the conditions of neoliberal world order on nation-states 
thus challenges democratic governance in more fundamental ways and 
in turn gives birth to new forms of national and global resistance29. 
                                                 
24 COX 1987, pp. 273-85. 
25 COX 1987, p. 271; MORTON 2007, p. 124. 
26 COX 1987, pp. 286-88. 
27 COX 1996, p. 302. 
28 MORTON 2007, p. 125. 
29 GILL 1995. 







3. Three Challenges for Neo-Gramscians in IR Studies Today 
 
Having sketched out a brief account of the approach of neo-
Gramscians, I want to turn now to consider three important criticisms 
or challenges that it seems to me they have so far failed to address 
adequately in their analysis of IR. The criticism raised here should not, 
however, be conflated with some familiar critiques raised in an earlier 
period. For while it clearly owes something to them, I am also skeptical 
of many of the arguments raised in these earlier critiques. They in fact 
tended to focus on three key issues: the neo-Gramscians’ apparent lack 
of Marxist materialism30; their adherence to a passé mode of Marxist 
analysis that provides an excessively reductionist - class and economic - 
account of international relations31; and finally, their supposed 
decontextualization and misreading of Gramsci’s thought that illicitly 
converts him into a theorist of the international when his analysis was 
firmly orientated towards the nation-state32, and the Italian nation-state 
in particular33. It seems to me at least, that while the latter two 
criticisms of these three have some justification, they are on the whole 
grossly overstated. In what follows I therefore sail a course between 
these early critiques and neo-Gramscian responses to them to highlight 
what I regard as three important shortcomings of neo-Gramscian 
analysis that appear particularly pertinent today. 
The first of these concerns the tendency of neo-Gramscians to 
theorize the spread of the neoliberal world order in terms of an all-
powerful «transnational managerial class» imposing neoliberal 
globalization on nation-states from above. This criticism was first raised 
by Leo Panitch who contested in particular the unrealistic «top-down» 
nature of the analysis typified in Cox’s depiction of modern states as 
«transmission belts» for the implementation of neoliberal policies 
devised in transnational institutions34. The problem with this approach 
is that it not only undervalues the continuing importance of nation-
                                                 
30 BURNHAM 1991 and 1994. 
31 ASHLEY 1989; HOBSON 1998; SPEGELE 1997. For similar criticism from 
within a broadly Historical Materialist approach see too WORTH 2011. 
32 FEMIA 2005 and 2009; GERMAIN AND KENNY 1998; SAURIN 2009. 
33 BELLAMY 1990; BELLAMY AND SCHECHTER 1993. 
34 PANITCH 1994; see too, BAKER 1999; WORTH 2009. 





states as loci of considerable power in the modern world, but also, fails 
to adequately appreciate the impact of class struggle and conflict within 
them that can cut across and thwart global class alliances. 
This critique is not new and neo-Gramscians have gone some 
considerable way to address it. For example, Cox’s reformulation of 
world order as a decentered impersonal «nébuleuse» dominated by 
finance capitalism in a form of «governance without government»35 is 
unquestionably less hierarchical than in his earlier work. Morton’s 
empirical work, moreover, has a decidedly more state-centric approach 
and he is himself critical of neo-Gramscians who give too much weight 
to transnational elites in a top-down orientation that fails to appreciate 
how local interests build alliances to initiate and drive forward capitalist 
accumulation and neoliberalization at the periphery36. It is arguable, 
however, that Morton’s reliance on a Trotsky-inspired focus on «uneven 
and combined development» of capitalist economics means the primary 
determinant for passive revolutions or «minimal forms of hegemony» at 
the periphery is the external capitalist international core and in that sense 
his approach remains – structurally at least – overly top-down in its 
mode of analysis37. 
Moreover, this top-down critique seems particularly relevant today 
in a world in which nation-states are reasserting their capacity to 
strategically limit the processes of globalization in response to popular 
demands and the survival of cross-class alliances at the national level. 
The capacity to resist is for sure uneven, but is typified by the 2016 
decision by public referendum of the United Kingdom to leave the EU 
(and its free market of goods, labour and services), and indeed, the 
protectionist and anti-immigration politics that are on the rise all over 
the world. The latter have of course found new expression in the United 
States with Donald Trump’s commitment to build a «beautiful border 
wall». What these contemporary political developments illustrate is, 
that assumptions among neo-Gramscians that nation-states are merely 
«transmission belts» for neoliberal globalization imposed by 
transnational classes seem more than ever in need of serious revision. 
                                                 
35 COX 1996, pp. 298-99, 301. 
36 MORTON 2013. 
37 Of the three neo-Gramscians I consider Morton’s theoretical proximity to 
Gramsci and his consequent rich and detailed analysis of state, class and spatial 
relations within the nation-state (mainly Mexico), make him less susceptible to 
the criticisms I am raising here.  





A second major challenge to neo-Gramscian IR concerns its 
continuing failure to move beyond a mode of critical political economy 
aimed at neoliberal globalization to consider seriously forms of 
resistance. As early observers also pointed out, there is in fact a 
propensity to concentrate on and present the formation and structures 
of neoliberal hegemony in such an all-powerful light that little space is 
left to theorize and investigate convincingly how resistance is - and 
might be - formed to oppose it38. It is certainly true that neo-Gramscians 
have gone some way to addressing this weakness by extending the focus 
on forms of resistance39, but overall the field remains predominantly 
preoccupied with exploring the mechanisms of neoliberal hegemony 
internationally. Thus, one is bound to remain sceptical about the 
capacity of this theoretical model to make good on its claims to move 
beyond the explanation of its predecessors into the realm of critical 
praxis. 
This, in fact, leads me to the final and most important challenge I 
wish to raise here which relates to the excessively globalized and 
cosmopolitan manner in which neo-Gramscians theorize neoliberal 
hegemony and especially resistance to it. Among the three authors 
focused on here, there is little doubt that it is Gill in particular who has 
provided the most influential account of potential resistance in his 
Gramsci-inspired conception of the «postmodern Prince». Written in 
the direct aftermath of the Battle of Seattle (1999), Gill’s initial account 
of the postmodern Prince identified it with an alternative «politics of 
globalization» and «global democratic collective action» led principally 
by transnational protest movements like the Alternative Globalization 
Movement (AGM) and the World Social Forum (WSF)40. In 2012 he 
returned to the idea of the postmodern Prince incorporating now the 
emerging movements of the Arab Spring and the then expanding 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA)41. In the early years of 
the millennium Gill’s optimism that these movements might eventually 
mature into «something akin to a postmodern transnational political 
party»42 was perhaps understandable, but from the contemporary 
perspective this attempt to theorize and investigate a credible resistance 
                                                 
38 CAMMACK 1999; DRAINVILLE 1994, 1995; STRANGE 2002. 
39 See, for example, GILL 2000, 2012; MORTON 2013; BIELER 2011. 
40 GILL 2000, p. 140. 
41 GILL 2012. 
42 GILL 2000, p. 138. 





within primarily transnational movements appears signally 
unconvincing. For today we can see that the projected potential of these 
movements like the AGM, the WSF, the Arab Spring and ALBA have 
not only failed to materialize, but are everywhere in retreat and are in 
effect being outflanked by a wave of populist movements that are deeply 
embedded in national contexts.  
In these circumstances, neo-Gramscian attempts to theorize 
resistance and neoliberalism in excessively globalized terms is in serious 
need of revision. Indeed, its future development requires in my view a 
return to the letter of Gramsci’s writings and particularly his 
emphatically bottom-up account of hegemony under the category of the 
«national-popular». However, it is not the intention here to re-rehearse 
the arguments advanced by Germain and Kenny and Femia noted above 
that Gramsci was essentially a theorist of the nation-state whose ideas 
have no serious bearing on international politics. In fact, as I have 
maintained elsewhere against this critique, Gramsci is at once a theorist 
of the national and international (internationalism) and his concept of 
hegemony and especially the «national-popular» are inscribed with an 
essential international perspective43. Thus, while the Prison Notebooks 
and hegemony are open to a range of contested interpretations44, what 
seems relatively clear is that throughout their pages Gramsci continued 
to treat capitalism (and the working class) as he had done in 1919 as «a 
world historical phenomenon»45. He continued to regard both as 
developing an increasingly international character, and despite his 
rejection of the Stalinist Comintern, he continued to believe in the 
necessity for forces of resistance embedded in national contexts to build 
an international movement of coordination and support46. In fact, 
Gramsci convincingly argues in the Quaderni that there are no 
nationally specific forms of economics, politics or culture in absolute 
terms, since «international relations intertwine with …internal relations 
of nation-states,’ though in this process they do create at the level of the 
nation-state ‘new unique and historically concrete combinations»47. 
                                                 
43 MCNALLY 2009. 
44 LIGUORI 2015, pp. 176-91. 
45 GRAMSCI 1977, p. 69. 
46 MCNALLY 2009: pp. 64-5; see too, IVES AND SHORT 2013. 
47 GRAMSCI 1975, Q13, §17, p. 1585; GRAMSCI 1971, p. 182. 





Neo-Gramscian IR scholars have rightly emphasized these aspects of 
Gramsci’s thought, but they have also overplayed the international 
dimension of Gramsci’s hegemony in my view, undervaluing – in theory 
and application - its «national-popular» character. Here, it is particularly 
important to grasp the strategic coordinates of Gramsci’s account of 
hegemony as a political and ideological struggle to build a series of 
«national-popular» relations that articulates classes to local historically 
grounded mass ideologies and identities. In effect, Gramsci inflects his 
internationalism to give strategic primacy to the national struggle while 
continuing to maintain the necessity for integrated coordination and 
support at the international level. This is important since it is a move 
that links his thought to democracy; democracy, that is, understood not 
in any abstract sense as a set of principles and institutions, but in its 
radical historical concrete sense as democratic praxis, or the awakening 
and effective mobilization of the popular masses without which no 
subversion of elite-dominated societies can take place48. 
The «national-popular» is thus a critical concept in Gramsci that 
guides the working class movement and its various intellectual strata to 
undergo an ideological transformation without which hegemony over 
the working masses cannot be achieved. This required above all the 
rejection of an internationalism characterised by abstract 
«cosmopolitanism» and the application of a universalized conceptual 
armoury that had little more than «“geographical” seats» in each 
nation49. In fact, in what is perhaps one of the most important passages 
in the Notebooks he makes clear how he conceives hegemony as both 
international and national-popular in character praising the Bolsheviks – 
not for abandoning internationalism – but «purging internationalism of 
every vague and purely ideological (in a pejorative sense) element, to 
give it a realistic political content». He then provides a vital insight into 
how he conceives of hegemony in relation to the international and 
national strategies. 
 
«It is in the concept of hegemony that those exigencies which are national in 
character are knotted together… A class that is international in character has – 
in as much as it guides social strata which are narrowly national (intellectuals), 
                                                 
48 LACLAU 2005. 
49 GRAMSCI 1975, Q10, §61, p. 1361; GRAMSCI 1971, p. 117. For an analysis of 
Gramsci’s critique of abstract cosmopolitanism in the Quaderni in favour of a 
«cosmopolitismo di tipo nuovo», see, IZZO 2016. 





and indeed frequently even less than national: particularistic and municipalistic 
(the peasants) – to “nationalise” itself in a certain sense»50. 
 
The leading group’s ideology, according to Gramsci then, should also 
be «nationalised» since «non-national concepts (i.e. ones that cannot be 
referred to each individual country) are erroneous» and «have led to 
passivity and inertia…»51. 
However, for a hegemonic group to nationalise its intellectual and 
conceptual armoury was not enough for Gramsci. For he makes clear 
that hegemony also requires emotional understanding and expression of 
the demands of the populous among the leading group’s intellectuals. In 
other words, a hegemonic class should have organic intellectuals 
embedded in the culture of the masses who «know and sense their needs, 
aspirations and feelings’ so that they actually «feel tied to them» and 
their movement becomes in effect ‘«an articulation with organic 
functions of the people themselves»52. In fact, Gramsci sums up the 
«entire work» of the Modern Prince (i.e. the Party) as «intellectual and 
moral reform» aimed at «the formation of a national-popular collective will 
[my italics], of which the modern Prince is at one and the same time the 
organiser and the active operative expression…»53. Significantly, his 
model here was not only the Bolsheviks, but also, the radical bourgeoisie 
in the French Revolution (i.e. the Jacobins). Their slogans «stirred up» 
the «great popular masses» with the aim of placing themselves «at the 
head of all the national forces… identifying the interests and the 
requirements common to all the national forces, in order to set these 
forces in motion and lead them into the struggle»54. 
Finally, in Gramsci’s conception of the national-popular there is an 
emphatically realist strategic account of democracy that he acquired 
from his United Front experience and that taught him that hegemony is 
a battle for the masses in which every advance of one’s own mass forces 
                                                 
50 GRAMSCI 1975, Q14, §68, pp. 1729-30; GRAMSCI 1971, pp. 240-1. 
51 GRAMSCI 1975, Q14, §68, pp. 1729-30; GRAMSCI 1971, pp. 240-1. 
52 GRAMSCI 1975, Q21, §5, p. 2117; GRAMSCI 1985, p. 209. 
53 GRAMSCI 1975, Q13, §1, pp. 1560-61; GRAMSCI 1971, pp. 132-33. 
54 GRAMSCI 1975, Q19, §24, pp. 2028-29; GRAMSCI 1971, p. 78. For a further 
discussion of the affective relationship between democracy and hegemony in the 
Quaderni that captures the elements of mass praxis and the emotive mobilizing 
quality of Machiavellian myth, see, FROSINI 2016. 





is a weakening of the opposition55. A successful «national-popular» 
struggle for hegemony must therefore be attuned to the dynamics of 
mass politics in the national and regional context and the necessity to 
deprive the opposition «of every zone of passivity in which it would be 
possible to enrol Vendee-type armies»56. This above all would require 
emerging forces of resistance to fully appreciate for strategic purposes 
that while «the line of development is towards internationalism… the 
point of departure is “national” – and it is from this point of departure 
that one must begin»57.  
Neo-Gramscians are fond of quoting this passage from Gramsci to 
emphasize his internationalist credentials, it seems to me however that 
they have not fully appreciated the primary force of its intentions. This 
was not in fact a declaration of internationalism per se, but of a particular 
kind of internationalism inscribed with a national-popular strategy – as 
outlined above – which would allow the emerging working class 
resistance to mount a credible strategic challenge for hegemony. To 
deprive hegemony of this national-popular mass democratic character as 
neo-Gramscians do is therefore to depart from Gramsci in a manner that 
adds no value to their mode of analysis. On the contrary, it undermines 
their capacity to account for the enduring quality of forms of capitalism 
(including its virulent neoliberal variety today), and more importantly, it 
negates hegemony’s critical and radical potential as a guide to 
understanding the potential for mass democratic resistance. 
 
 
4. Conclusion: Retrieving the National-Popular 
 
Indeed, I would argue that a retrieval of the «national-popular» 
character of Gramsci’s account of hegemony in neo-Gramscian 
scholarship would allow them to meet all three challenges outlined 
above. For the «national-popular» in Gramsci indicated a rejection of 
excessively top-down accounts of capitalism, it foregrounded resistance, 
and above all it indicated how effective resistance must eschew abstract 
cosmopolitan internationalism and adopt an internationalism that fully 
appreciates how capitalism has embedded itself in local and national 
                                                 
55 MCNally 2015; PAGGI 1984. 
56 GRAMSCI 1975, Q19, §24, p. 2029; GRAMSCI 1971, p. 79.  
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contexts. Accordingly, it required the forces of resistance to develop a 
more profound and strategically advanced national-popular strategy 
that is capable of superseding capitalist hegemony.  
This appraisal and its emphasis on the national-popular will no doubt 
appear to some all too pessimistic, or perhaps another attempt to 
criticize from some mythical vantage position of insight into the one 
true meaning of the Prison Notebooks. It is well therefore to restate the 
arguments raised at the beginning of this article and to reconnect with 
them here in concluding.  
I have argued that neo-Gramscian scholarship has already made a 
transformational and progressive contribution to the study of IR in 
providing a framework of analysis informed by Gramsci’s hegemony 
that is uniquely critical and sensitive to the ways in which power is 
exercised in international politics through a combination of (inter-)state 
and economic coercion and ideological forms of national and global 
consent-building. It has also developed its accounts of resistance in 
response to earlier criticism and shows signs of a greater determination 
to make good on its critical potential in this area. Insofar as its 
proponents depart from Gramsci, I am broadly sympathetic with such 
moves as long as they are acknowledged and can be justified in terms of 
sharpening and updating its conceptual tools in light of the change of 
context from the world in which Gramsci developed hegemony to our 
own.  
However, the failure to assimilate fully the national-popular 
character of Gramsci’s hegemony and his complementary conception of 
internationalism as nodal – to use a term coined from Morton58 – is 
manifestly not of this order. For despite globalization, the masses 
remain today embedded in national and local political cultures and look 
primarily to the institutions at this level – national, regional and local 
governments – to address their demands as they did in Gramsci’s own 
time. It is indeed a mistake to underestimate how neoliberalism is 
interwoven into the fabric of mass national-popular cultures and 
institutions at this level, and to underestimate their continuing power 
and resilience. Nor should we imagine its decapitation by some assault 
                                                 
58 MORTON 2007, p. 122. Morton maintains that «it is within this nodal 
“national” context that hegemony is initially constructed, prior to outward 
expansion on a world scale» (p. 123). I would argue rather that in Gramsci this 
is a structural characteristic of global hegemony – political, economic and 
cultural - that should not be confined to explaining its initial stages.  





on a fictitious centre. I have argued above that Gramsci’s account of the 
national-popular teaches us to eschew such illusions for a strategy of 
hegemony that aims to dismantle it at its dispersed foundations. The 
invocation here to retrieve the national-popular coordinates of Gramsci’s 
hegemony are, moreover, by no means an attempt to dismiss neo-
Gramscian scholarship. On the contrary, it is rather an effort to 
contribute to an ongoing discussion which will hopefully lead to the 
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